Opinion: US Biodefense Policy Under Scrutiny as NIH, CDC Pandemic Preparedness Programs Face Cuts

Why does an administration that has as one of its central tenets that SARS-CoV-2, the virus responsible for COVID-19, was an engineered entity, possibly a biological weapon, now appear to be dismantling our biodefense capabilities? The importance of this question is self-evident. As we are constraining our public health system and spreading misinformation regarding the effectiveness of its strategies, we are facing increasing possibilities of biological attacks.

The administration's concern about biosecurity is illustrated by the White House blocking content on the coronavirus.gov website and forwarding the users to a site packed with evidence supporting the lab origin of the virus. Despite assertions by many on the far left, there is abundant evidence supporting a lab origin, though not conclusive. The same can be said about the wet market origin theory.

However, biopreparedness extends far beyond the contention that the coronavirus was possibly a manmade bioweapon. Recently, illegal biolabs in California and Las Vegas have been reportedly tied to a Chinese national linked to the Chinese Communist Party. In the California lab, authorities found approximately 20 infectious disease samples, including dengue fever, HIV, tuberculosis, and the deadliest form of malaria, along with approximately 1,000 mice, which could be used for testing.

The lab in Las Vegas had a similar setup, with over 1,000 samples being sent to the National Bioforensic Analysis Center in Maryland. Rep. Rick Crawford (R-AR), House Intelligence Committee Chairman, has echoed these concerns by warning that illicit biolabs on US soil pose a “serious national security threat” with the potential of infecting citizens to start a new pandemic. It is also feared that regulatory oversight is far too lax.

A National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) has recommended “Enhanced Oversight of nonfederally funded and international research (with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs) and Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC))”. Unfortunately, this Board has only 5 of 25 voting member positions filled and has not met since November of 2024.

Despite these findings, we are not building our biodefenses. In actuality, we appear to be tearing them down. A recent commentary published in Nature Medicine and cowritten by the head of the National Institute of Health (NIH), and now the acting director of the CDC, Jay Bhattacharya, MD, PhD, and the acting director of The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), Jeffery Taubenberger, MD, PhD, describes the elimination of “biodefense/pandemic preparedness” as 1 of the 3 main foci from the NIH's strategic plan.

This action is, in itself, extremely problematic, but the commentary also casts doubt on time-tested public health strategies: “Lockdowns, social distancing, school closures, wearing masks and vaccine mandates.” A single reference was used to justify this concern. A reference that analyzed nonblinded studies that were often poorly implemented and exposed subjects to prolonged and high doses of biological agents.

A news article in Nature emphasized these concerns, stating that NIH “staff members have been instructed to scrub this topic and ‘biodefense’ from the agency’s website.” The article states that about a third of NIAID’s $6.6 billion budget funds projects related to biodefense and emerging infectious diseases. This funding appears to be in jeopardy.

Not only has the NIH been hobbled in its ability to respond to biological threats, but so has the CDC. A recent article by STAT describes the profound impact of federal closures. Thirty-eight of 82 CDC databases, which were updated monthly, have been discontinued; 87% of these focused on vaccines, and 4 addressed respiratory diseases. The impact was profoundly described by Robert Shpiner, MD, who stressed the importance of having access to this data, writing: “When influenza surged, we had antivirals ready. When adult RSV [respiratory syncytial virus] spiked, we warned colleagues in pediatrics. When resistant pathogens emerged, we adjusted our antibiotic choices before culture results returned.”

If I were a foreign adversary who had a goal of weakening the US’ response to a biological threat, possibly making us vulnerable to an augmented, laboratory grown biological agent, I would devise a campaign discouraging the public from using preventative measures, such as N95 respirators, isolation, and vaccinations; along with not emphasizing the importance of businesses and indoor facilities to maintain the cleanest possible indoor air. And then I would neuter federal agencies in such a way that it would inhibit their pandemic and biological warfare response.

I am confused about why right-leaning public health policies, which during the peak of COVID-19 seemed to emphasize the risks of a lab-created and modified virus, would also oppose strict pandemic measures to control its spread and weaken our federal agencies' response capabilities. If the administration does not change course, not only our health, but the security of our nation will be placed at grave risk.